The Fiscal and Measurement Frame
The Ledger
Every serious platform owes the public two answers. How will you pay for it? And how will you know it worked? Most platforms dodge both. This document is our answer to both, with every number pinned to a primary source.
Download the Ledger (PDF)Where the money is
Part One: How We Pay
The baseline, stated plainly
In fiscal year 2025 the federal government collected $5.2 trillion and spent $7.0 trillion, leaving a deficit of $1.8 trillion, about 5.8 percent of the economy. That is the ledger this platform inherits. Any agenda that pretends the starting point is a blank checkbook is not being honest, and any critic who pretends the current ledger is healthy is not being honest either. The status quo is not free. It ran $1.8 trillion in the red in FY2025 while leaving people uninsured, unhoused, and uncounted.
Where the money is
Before this platform asks anyone for a new dollar, it goes where the money already is. Five families of financing run through every brief on this site, and every big-ticket proposal names which family it draws on.
- Collect what is already owed. The IRS projects the gross tax gap for tax year 2022, tax legally owed but not paid on time, at $696 billion. Its projected net gap is $606 billion after enforcement and other late payments. Read that number the honest way: it measures the size of the problem, not the size of the available money, because the net gap is by definition the part enforcement does not reach, and the scored yield of rebuilt enforcement is what the ten-year table below actually books, on the order of $127 billion per decade per funding tranche, not hundreds of billions a year. A disproportionate share of unreported income is business and pass-through income, which is concentrated among higher earners, where audit coverage was allowed to wither; separate Treasury-affiliated research estimates the top of the distribution accounts for an outsized share, and that estimate is distinct from the IRS gap figure itself.
- End the preferences that fail the test. Federal tax expenditures, the deductions, credits, and carveouts written into the code, sum to roughly $2.2 trillion in the FY2025 tally. Each should be required to demonstrate its public value. The Tax Code Public Value Test in Pillars 2 and 7 exists to keep the ones that earn their keep and end the ones that are just extraction with a filing requirement.
- Stop paying twice for failure. The GAO counted $186 billion in improper federal payments in fiscal 2025 alone, up $24 billion from the year before, and its own caveat is that the true number is higher. Add the damage the public absorbs when emissions are not fully priced, and the money wasted before any new program is even proposed runs to hundreds of billions a year. Pricing pollution honestly, as Pillar 7 proposes, both cuts that damage and raises revenue while doing it.
- Honest new revenue, named as such. Some of this platform requires real taxes, and we say so. Fixing the cap that lets the highest earners stop paying into Social Security partway through the year is a tax change. Taxing wealth no more gently than work is a tax change. We think both are fair, and we refuse to disguise either as something else.
- Purchases that return more than they cost. The child allowance, universal school meals, the care agenda, and the tutoring corps are purchases. The evidence, pinned throughout the briefs and the Evidence page, is that they are purchases with returns, in child poverty cut nearly in half within a single year when the expanded Child Tax Credit was tried, and in lifetime earnings, health, and reduced crime. But a return on investment is not the same as free, and this platform does not use the words interchangeably.
What these numbers are, and are not
The five families above are honest pools, not a budget, and pretending otherwise would break this page's own rule. The $696 billion tax gap is a gross projection for tax year 2022; the $606 billion net projection accounts for enforcement and other late payments, and no enforcement regime collects it all, because audits cost money and returns diminish. Improper payments are not all fraud and not all recoverable; the GAO's category includes documentation failures and even underpayments. The $2.2 trillion in tax expenditures is not a pot to sweep; ending a preference changes behavior, interacts with other taxes, and some expenditures are policy commitments this platform would defend under its own Public Value Test. And a social return on investment is not a federal budget offset: a program that repays society several times over can still require an appropriation every year. What this page establishes is where the money is and what the platform refuses to pretend. The ten-year table below is the first stage of the full model, provisional and labeled as such until it has independent review.
The ten-year table (v1.3)
The rules: a number appears only if an official scorekeeper (CBO, JCT, the Social Security actuaries) or a clearly labeled independent estimate published it. A row's high end is held at the figure the scorekeeper actually published rather than extrapolated past it. Score windows differ by row and are stated. These historical estimates have not been rebased to a common current-law window; the totals below are arithmetic illustrations, not a unified budget score. The paid-leave estimate spans eleven fiscal years. Rows without an honest score stay blank and say so, because a blank is more useful than a guess. The whole table is downloadable as JSON, and independent scoring or challenge is invited through the report form.
Revenue and savings
| Item | Low | Central | High | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rebuild IRS enforcement (collect what is owed) Scored Gross revenue about $200-207B per tranche; net about $127B. The high end is held at the scored net figure rather than the gross one: CBO puts outlays at $80B and revenues at $207B, so $127B is the net result, and a $200B net would require gross revenue no scorekeeper has estimated. Returns diminish with scale, which is why this line is a fraction of the $606B projected net tax gap for tax year 2022, not the whole pot. CBO November 2021 estimate through 2031; historical baseline, not a 2026-2035 rescore. | $127B | $127B | $127B | CBO, Estimated Revenue Effects of Increased Funding for the IRS in H.R. 5376 (net of costs) |
| Social Security cap fix (tax work and high earnings alike) Scored These are two different published designs, not a probability range. No central design has been selected. The 90% alternative credits additional benefits; the above-$250,000 alternative does not. Payroll receipts support Social Security, with an income-tax offset in the net estimates. Excluded from the general-fund illustration. Official FY2025-2034 window; historical baseline, not a rescore for 2026-2035. | $727.6B | $1,426.8B | CBO/JCT: 90% taxable share ($727.6B) or tax earnings above $250,000 ($1,426.8B), FY2025-2034 | |
| Pollution price (gross, before dividends) Scored Both ends are CBO's own alternatives for a $25/ton tax: $768.9B rising 2 percent a year above inflation, $865.4B rising 5 percent. The high end is held at the top scored alternative rather than extrapolated past it. Higher rates toward the EPA damage benchmark would raise the gross flow further, but no scorekeeper has published that figure, so it is not booked here. The platform's design returns this revenue to households as dividends, so the NET budget effect is approximately zero by design; the gross flow is shown because it is what funds the dividends. Official FY2023-2032 score window; not a current-law rescore. | $769B | $865B | $865B | CBO budget option: Impose a Tax on Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (2023-2032) |
| Expand drug price negotiation (HR 3-scale) Scored The current SMART Prices vehicle is narrower than HR 3 and has no comparable public score yet; the HR 3 score is the anchor for negotiation at scale. CBO notes innovation trade-offs in the underlying model. Official 2020-2029 window for the negotiation provisions, not the whole H.R. 3 bill or a current-law rescore. | $456B | $456B | $456B | CBO, H.R. 3 Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (negotiation title) |
| Tax Code Public Value Test (review of ~$2.2T/yr FY2025 in expenditures) Not yet scored A review process, not a specified repeal list. Peterson reports about $2.2T for FY2025 using individual tax-expenditure estimates; JCT warns the estimates cannot be added to calculate the yield from simultaneous repeal. No revenue is booked. | not yet scored | |||
| Improper payments reduction Not yet scored The $186B FY2025 GAO estimate includes underpayments and documentation failures, not a recoverable pot; savings depend on program-by-program fixes no scorekeeper has priced as a package. | not yet scored |
Spending
| Item | Low | Central | High | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Permanent child allowance (2021-design CTC) Scored Same permanent 2021-design credit, two accounting treatments: low and central are the conventional score, high includes $113.2B of macroeconomic revenue feedback. Not a phase-in range. JCT excludes some potential long-run benefits of reduced child poverty from its models. Official FY2023-2032 window and October 2022 baseline; not a current-law rescore. | $1,253.8B | $1,253.8B | $1,367B | JCT, Permanent Child Tax Credit Expansion (October 2022): $1,253.8B conventional; $1,367.0B with macroeconomic feedback |
| Childcare cap and universal pre-K Scored CBO published one $381.5B estimate for the House-passed BBB provisions, not a $380-400B range. The design differs from the current Child Care for Working Families Act; this is a historical scale anchor. Official 2022-2031 score window; historical BBB design, not a current-law rescore. | $381.5B | $381.5B | $381.5B | CBO, child care and universal preschool provisions ($381.5B, 2022-2031) |
| Paid family and medical leave (FAMILY Act) Scored CBO estimated $547B in direct spending and $319B in net revenue from the dedicated payroll tax over 2020-2030, for a $228B deficit increase. The former $225B low endpoint lacked a matching cited score and has been removed. Official 2020-2030 period (11 fiscal years); retained as a historical scale anchor, not normalized to 2026-2035. | $547B | $547B | $547B | CBO, H.R. 1185 FAMILY Act ($547B gross; 0.4% payroll tax offsets ~$319B; net ~$228B) |
| Universal school meals Estimated (non-CBO) Baker Institute (2024) reports about $30B annually for universal provision versus $19B then spent: approximately $11B additional per year. Multiplying by ten gives $110B without inflation, phase-in, or baseline adjustment; this is arithmetic, not an official score. The previous $300B high bound mixed total and incremental spending. | $110B | $110B | $110B | Baker Institute (2024), approximately $30B total versus $19B baseline annually; $11B incremental |
| National tutoring corps Not yet scored No federal vehicle has been scored; the brief scales it with its evaluations, so the honest number waits for the design. | not yet scored | |||
| Social housing and public developer Not yet scored Cost turns entirely on scale and delivery discipline; the housing brief conditions scaling on delivery performance, so v1 does not guess. | not yet scored | |||
| National service build-out Not yet scored Staged by design: costs scale with the evaluated voluntary expansion, and the mandate step only exists if the build-out proves it. Program-scale benefit-cost studies exist; a universal score does not. Order-of-magnitude bound, stated not scored: at the brief's stipend and education-award levels, four million participants implies at least ~$100B/yr before health coverage, housing, and administration. | not yet scored | |||
| Innovation pillar net cost (public-return offsets) Not yet scored The innovation brief describes the pillar as designed to be largely self-financing through public-return terms on subsidies, drug-pricing savings, and dividend flows. That is design intent, not a score; per the blank-rows rule, the row stays blank until specific mechanisms are scored. | Innovation brief (design intent) | |||
| National Resilient Communities and Corridors Program Not yet scored Cost turns on the number and mix of projects funded across the three tracks, and the programme is designed so that mix is set by competitive scoring rather than fixed in advance. Per-project federal exposure is capped in the authorizing statute before ground breaks, and land-value capture is designed to service the infrastructure debt. No scorekeeper has priced this as a package. | not yet scored | |||
| Water Utility Defense Standard and regional support teams Not yet scored The standard applies across nearly 170,000 US drinking-water and wastewater systems, most of them small, and cost depends on how the baseline is tiered by utility size and risk, which the strategy sets rather than the brief. The commitment is that federal security appropriations carry a substantial share rather than loading the cost onto household water bills, which fixes the direction of the flow without fixing the amount. GAO has documented the sector-wide gap but has not priced remediation. | not yet scored |
What the v1.3 table shows, read honestly: every row retains its published historical window and baseline. No common-window score is available here. Using net figures where dedicated revenue exists (paid leave nets about $228B after its own payroll tax) while setting aside what cannot honestly be pooled (the Social Security cap fix is trust-fund revenue that strengthens Social Security, not general funds; the pollution price returns as dividends), the historical arithmetic is $1,973.3B of scored and estimated general-fund costs against $583B of general-fund revenue, leaving $1,390.3B before the scenario below. This is not a current-law score or a forecast of the funding gap. Policy interactions, updated baselines, and unscored commitments could change the result. The healthcare shift is presented separately below. The limitations belong beside the numbers; publishing it is the point. Closing it is the work of the rows still blank, the wealth-versus-work tax commitments not yet specified into scoreable designs, and the honest possibility that some proposals phase in slower than advocates want. A platform that showed you a table that magically balanced would be lying somewhere inside it.
Universal healthcare (Medicare for All path), presented separately on purpose
Federal ledger: $1,500B to $3,000B more in federal healthcare subsidies in 2030 versus the then-current-law baseline (CBO 2020 illustrative options). Total national health spending: In CBO’s 2020 analysis, national health expenditures in 2030 range from $700B lower to $300B higher than the then-current-law baseline, with nearly universal coverage (CBO, single-payer working paper and economic analysis).
Never summed into the table: this is a design-dependent shift of existing private spending (premiums, out-of-pocket) onto the federal ledger, not new consumption on the scale of the federal number. Summing it with the rows above would double-count what families already pay. The binding design constraint: most working families must pay less in new taxes than they now pay in premiums and out-of-pocket costs. The platform's named financing design now lives in the healthcare brief: an employer maintenance-of-effort conversion phasing into payroll contributions, with progressive surtax elements at end-state; exact rates await official scoring against the published family-cost constraint.
The big one: healthcare, without flinching
The largest number on this platform is universal, comprehensive, affordable healthcare, with Medicare for All as the clearest path. The honest accounting comes from the Congressional Budget Office itself: a 2020 analysis of five illustrative single-payer options projected $1.5 to $3.0 trillion more in federal healthcare subsidies in 2030 than under the law then in effect, and, under most designs CBO analyzed, total national health spending would stay roughly flat or fall, by as much as $0.7 trillion, with nearly universal coverage. Both halves of that sentence are true at once, and so is the assumption underneath the favorable half: the lower-spending results come from designs that pay providers at Medicare-adjacent rates and capture large administrative savings, and those payment rates are themselves the central political fight, which is part of why this platform carries a bridge and not just a destination. Single payer is a historic shift of costs from premiums and deductibles onto the federal ledger, not a historic increase in what the country actually spends on care. Families would stop paying insurers and start paying taxes, and the binding design requirement is that for most working families the second number comes out smaller. The household tables below begin testing that requirement; they do not demonstrate it has been met. Version zero shows an illustrative 7 percent contribution below the example family premium but potentially above the single worker’s premium plus out-of-pocket costs, which establishes the need for a progressive rate structure or a wage exemption. Whether the final design satisfies the requirement remains to be demonstrated through official scoring and independently reviewed household tables, and the platform's commitment is that it does not pass without them. It is also why the platform accepts a Swiss-style universal system as a bridge: the destination is non-negotiable, the financing politics are hard, and pretending otherwise is exactly the kind of dishonesty this document exists to rule out.
The household tables, v0
A financing promise that never shows you a household is a slogan. These tables are version zero of the discipline: the left side is what illustrative households would pay using dated survey averages; the right side is the binding rule any financing design must satisfy before this platform supports it. One scenario is worked as an illustration and labeled that way, because the platform deliberately does not commit to a rate before scoring. These averages are not estimates for every family of that size or income, and actual out-of-pocket costs vary.
| Household | Historical cost assumptions | The binding rule | Illustrative only (not a commitment) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Family of four, employer coverage, ~$80,000 wages | About $6,296/year in premium contributions (KFF 2024 employer survey), plus actual out-of-pocket costs, which vary by household. The 2024 average single deductible among workers in plans with a deductible was $1,787; a deductible is not a measure of annual spending | New contribution must come in below current premiums plus out-of-pocket costs | A 7% payroll-side contribution on $80,000 is $5,600, below the premium share alone; whether the final rate is 7% is exactly what scoring must settle |
| Single worker, employer coverage, ~$60,000 wages | About $1,368/year in premium contributions (KFF 2024), plus out-of-pocket costs | Same rule, and this is the honest hard case: a flat payroll rate that works for families can exceed what low-premium single workers pay today | 7% of $60,000 is $4,200. It exceeds the $1,368 premium assumption by $2,832 and fails the rule if annual out-of-pocket costs are below that difference. Actual costs and the final financing design determine the result |
| Uninsured adult | $0 in premiums, full exposure to list-price care and medical debt; KFF’s 2022 survey found 41% of adults had medical or dental debt (across insurance groups, not only the uninsured) | Gains coverage; contribution scales with income from zero | At low income the contribution is $0 and the gain is coverage itself |
What v0 is and is not: the current-cost column is pinned to the KFF 2024 Employer Health Benefits Survey, with the debt context from KFF’s 2022 survey. No national per-capita average is substituted for a household’s actual out-of-pocket expenses. The illustrative column is arithmetic on a placeholder rate, not a scored design, and it is published mostly because it exposes the single-worker problem a real design must solve. And the single-worker case gets a commitment, not just a diagnosis: the platform's default financing structure is a progressive schedule with an exempted first band of wages, and no financing design advances that leaves below-median wage-earning households paying more than they pay today in premiums plus out-of-pocket costs. Version one of these tables is independently reviewed household incidence for a fully specified financing design, and the healthcare brief commits to publishing that before passage, with the rule that if the tables cannot be made to satisfy the family constraint, the design changes until they do.
An illustrative scenario: three revenue cases
The gap above does not close itself, so here is the platform's first bounded answer, built the only honest way available: every component starts with a published Congressional Budget Office estimate or an explicitly labeled extrapolation, stacked into low, central, and high cases. Where a case scales a CBO increment (a 7-point corporate change from the 1-point option), the scaling is labeled, because independently scored options interact and the combined revenue cannot be inferred from the arithmetic sum. The second IRS tranche is an illustrative assumption, not a separate CBO score. These are bounds for planning, not point estimates, and none of the indicative rates is yet a scored platform bill.
| Case | Components and assumptions | Illustrative new revenue | Residual vs. $1,390.3B historical gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Low | Top-four-bracket rates +1 point (Half of CBO's $569.5B estimate for a +2-point top-four-bracket change; linear extrapolation, not a scored +1-point option); Corporate rate 21% to 24% (+3 points) (3 x CBO's $135.7B +1-point corporate option; linear extrapolation); Capital gains and dividends +2 points (CBO/JCT published +2-point option, FY2025-2034) | ~$795.15B | ~$595.15B remains |
| Central | Top-four-bracket rates +2 points (CBO/JCT published +2-point top-four-bracket option, FY2025-2034); Corporate rate 21% to 28% (+7 points) (7 x CBO's $135.7B +1-point corporate option; linear extrapolation, interactions unscored); Capital gains and dividends +2 points (CBO/JCT published +2-point option, FY2025-2034); IRS enforcement, second funding tranche (Illustrative repeat of the first tranche's net yield, NOT a CBO score of a second tranche; diminishing returns may reduce it) | ~$1749.7B | covered, ~$359.4B headroom |
| High | Everything in Central (as above); All-bracket rates +1 point (CBO/JCT published all-bracket +1-point option, FY2025-2034; combined effect with the top-bracket option is not scored) | ~$2935B | covered, ~$1544.7B headroom |
Read with the table above: the general-fund rows already scored there (IRS first tranche plus drug negotiation, about $583B) are counted in every case's residual; the pollution price and the Social Security cap fix are excluded here for the reasons stated there. Phase-in: Indicative sequencing: restored premium credits, school meals, and the child allowance in year one (their scores assume rapid start); childcare and paid leave phase over years two to four as systems build; rate changes effective year two; corporate phased two points per year. Unscored rows launch only when scored. If revenue misses: Priority order if revenue underperforms: the floors hold (child allowance, school meals, SNAP restoration, premium credits, the healthcare coverage floor); what slows first is the build-out layer (new-places pilots, service expansion, tutoring scale-up), explicitly and in public, rather than quiet across-the-board erosion. The debt path: No year-by-year debt path is claimed. The component scores use different historical windows and baselines. The displayed residuals are arithmetic checks, not evidence that the platform is financed under current law. A combined official score must account for interactions, interest, changed law, and unscored proposals.
Part Two: How We Count
The scoreboard problem
In 1934, the economist Simon Kuznets delivered to Congress the first national income accounts, the ancestor of GDP, and attached a warning: the welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income. We kept the number and discarded the warning. Ninety years later, GDP counts the coal burned, the cleanup afterward, and the hospital admissions in between, all as growth. It counts a ton of carbon dioxide at zero, though EPA's peer-reviewed 2023 estimate put the damage at about $190, a figure the current administration has formally withdrawn from government use, which changes the politics and not the physics; the peer-reviewed damage literature that produced it stands, the estimate is carried here as a central point in a contested range rather than a settled price, and if a future scorekeeper sets it lower, the revenue and the damage math shrink with it. It counts the $1.01 trillion of care that 59 million family caregivers provided in 2024 at exactly nothing, by AARP's 2026 valuation, which rose by roughly two-thirds from its ~$600 billion prior edition because the counted caregiver population grew from 38 to 59 million and the hourly replacement value rose with care wages, a revision, and labeled as one. And it cannot tell the difference between a country getting richer and a country selling off its topsoil, its water, and its children's climate and booking the proceeds as income.
This is not an abstract complaint. In a peer-reviewed study in the American Economic Review, economists Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus found that several American industries cause more air-pollution damage than the total value they add to the economy; coal-fired power's damages ran up to 5.6 times its value added. On GDP's scoreboard, every one of those industries looks like a contributor. On an honest ledger, they are net extraction. The IMF's global estimate makes the same point at scale, and the honest label matters: about $7.4 trillion in global fossil fuel underpricing in 2024. The December 2025 working paper estimates $725 billion in explicit fiscal subsidies and $6.7 trillion in implicit subsidies, primarily unpriced environmental costs. Call the explicit part a subsidy and the implicit part what it is, an externality bill, and the argument survives the standard rebuttal intact: either way, the public pays it.
What we propose instead
Not the abolition of GDP, and not degrowth. The proposal is honest bookkeeping, and most of it is already underway. In January 2023 the United States adopted a national strategy to build natural capital accounts, official statistics that put the nation's land, water, air, and resources on the books alongside its factories, with Bureau of Economic Analysis publishing pilot energy-flow accounts in February 2026. The 2023 strategy proposed phased implementation through 2036; that historical timetable is not a guarantee of future funding. This platform's asks are simple: fund it, codify it so no administration can quietly delete the accounts, and publish alongside GDP a short dashboard of what the headline number misses, net growth after pollution damage, the value of unpaid care, and whether natural assets are growing or being drawn down. That is the direction the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi commission recommended after the 2008 crisis, and it is the same principle as the keep-the-count plank elsewhere on this platform: a country that stops measuring a problem has not solved it.
This is not a war on growth but on fake growth. Nearly everything this platform proposes to build, homes, clean power, transmission, care, cures, shows up as growth on any honest ledger. What changes is that the ledger stops rewarding the industries whose profits depend on damage the accounts refuse to see, and stops telling the country it is getting richer in years when it is merely billing the future.
The standard we hold ourselves to
Every figure in this document traces to a primary source listed below, the same standard as the Evidence page. When a number is contested, we use the official scorekeeper's version. When a proposal costs money, we name the financing family it draws on. When the honest answer is that something is a real tax, we say the word. And when the evidence changes, the ledger changes with it, and the correction is public.
The whole of it comes to this. The money is there: nearly $700 billion in projected taxes owed but not paid on time for tax year 2022, $2.2 trillion in tax preferences in the FY2025 tally, $186 billion in payments the government itself calls improper, and carbon pollution without a nationwide federal price while it costs us on the order of $190 a ton by the peer-reviewed estimate the government produced and then withdrew. Collect what is owed, end what fails the test, price the damage, tell the truth about the rest, and fix the scoreboard so growth means what people think it means: life actually getting better, on a ledger that counts everything, including the things money never touched.
Sources
- BEA, Pilot U.S. Physical and Monetary Energy Flow Accounts (February 2026)
- KFF, Health Care Debt Survey (fielded February–March 2022)
- RGGI, regional power-sector carbon allowance programs (carbon pricing already exists in participating states)
- Peter G. Peterson Foundation, Tax Expenditures (FY2025 tally; not a combined repeal score)
- Congressional Budget Office, Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2025 (March 2026 update)
- IRS, Tax Gap Projections for Tax Year 2022 (Publication 5869)
- GAO, Improper Payments: Fiscal Year 2025 Estimates (GAO-26-108694)
- CBO, How CBO Analyzes the Costs of Proposals for Single-Payer Health Care Systems (Working Paper 2020-08)
- Kuznets, National Income 1929-1932 (Senate Doc. 124, 73rd Congress)
- Muller, Mendelsohn & Nordhaus, "Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United States Economy," American Economic Review (2011)
- EPA, Report on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (Dec 2023): about $190 per ton of CO2 at a 2% near-term discount rate. Status stated plainly: the current administration withdrew the interagency guidance in January 2025 and took the EPA page down, so the figure is carried via the Harvard EELP tracker as a peer-reviewed central estimate in a politically contested range, not as standing government policy
- IMF working paper, Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2025 Update (2024 estimates)
- AARP, Valuing the Invaluable 2026 Update: $1.01 trillion in unpaid family caregiving
- White House OSTP, National Strategy to Develop Statistics for Environmental-Economic Decisions (2023)
- Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009)